This is a correction to: Gemma Robles, José M. Méndez, A note on functional relations in a certain class of implicative expansions of FDE related to Brady’.

Business Ethics, the Environment & Responsibility, EarlyView.

For this issue of JBE, Zyphur and Pierides :1–16, 2017) have written a paper on a concept that they have labeled relational validity. The purpose of the paper and of their advocacy for the concept of relational validity is to improve the way that quantitative research is done by expanding our understanding of its ethics-laden aspects. I agree entirely with the authors that every decision regarding QR is an ethics-laden one and that our research as a whole would be improved (...) by recognition of this fact. I disagree with the authors regarding some of the ways that this improvement might be brought about. (shrink)

Tarski's 1936 paper, “On the concept of logical consequence”, is a rather philosophical, non-technical paper that leaves room for conflicting interpretations. My purpose is to review some important issues that explicitly or implicitly constitute its themes. My discussion contains four sections: terminological and conceptual preliminaries, Tarski's definition of the concept of logical consequence, Tarski's discussion of omega-incomplete theories, and concluding remarks concerning the kind of conception that Tarski's definition was intended to explicate. The third section involves subsidiary issues, such as (...) Tarski's discussion concerning the distinction between material and formal consequence and the important question ofthe criterion for distinguishing between logical and non-logical terms.§1. Preliminaries. In this paper an argument is a two-part system composed of a set of propositions P and a single proposition c. The expression ‘c is a [logical] consequence of P’ is used with the same meaning as the expression ‘c is [logically] implied by P’. The expressions ‘is a logical consequence of’ and the converse ‘implies’ are relational. Often, I shall be talking in the same sense of validity of an argument. Validity is a property of arguments; an argument with premise-set P and conclusion c is valid if and only if P implies c; i.e., c is a logical consequence of P. Notice that this notion of argument is strictly ontic; it does not involve any agent that thinks, determines or establishes that a given proposition is or is not a consequence of a given set of propositions. (shrink)

Unlike most American novels on the Iraq wars, which tend to be either celebratory or redemptive, Iraqi-born Sinan Antoon’s The Corspe Washer bears witness to the traumatic effects of destitu...

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Aristotle Rules, OK?José M. Villagrán (bio) and Rogelio Luque (bio)KeywordsAristotle, causes, philosophy, psychiatry, psychopathologyPérez-Alvarez, Sass, and García-Montes (2008) propose a theoretical approach to the nature of mental disorders (MD) that attempts to explain the type of reality they constitute. In line with this approach, they argue that (1) MDs should be considered not from within psychology and psychiatry, but rather from the realm of philosophy, so as to (...) avoid what they call the Charcot effect; (2) the resulting theoretical model is in contrast to naturalist models such as that of internal dysfunction, and involves “strong” constructivist assumptions from which they develop an anthropological perspective based on the clinician–patient situation; 3) this model is applicable, in principle, to all MDs (“at least to some extent”); and (4) it is based on the Aristotelian theory of the four causes.We would argue, however, that (1) it is precisely from within psychology and psychiatry that conceptual models accounting for MDs should be proposed; (2) the naturalist–constructivist dichotomy in these models should be deconstructed, and primacy given not to the ontological approach but to the epistemological one; (3) a theoretical model of this scope should account not only for MDs but also for physical disorders; and (4) only in this way would the Aristotelian theory of causes, understood as types of explanation (and therefore as epistemological approaches) be useful.Approaches from within and from WithoutFor Berrios (2006), the theoretical discourse in relation to the conceptualization of MDs in a particular sociocultural context can be formulated in two ways: on the one hand, in a centripetal fashion, using established philosophical systems (be it phenomenology [Jaspers 1977], logical empiricism [Hempel 1994], or analytic philosophy [Fulford, Thornton, and Graham 2006]). This centripetal approach can be used both by professional philosophers and by psychiatrists/psychologists. When developed by professional philosophers, such proposals, despite their possible brilliance, run the risk of being tangential to the psychiatric issues owing to a lack of first-hand experience of them (Murphy 2006). When developed by psychiatrists and psychologists, the majority of the proposals simply mix fragments of different philosophical systems, in either a kind of syncretism or collage that fails to take into account the contradictions between fragments, or a kind of pluralism that reflects, without entering into analysis, a sort of consensus among the different paradigms (Ghaemi 2003; Kendler 2005).A second way of formulating this theoretical discourse (according to Berrios) would employ a centrifugal approach from the very core of the disciplines, through the reflection of professionals (primarily, although not only, psychiatrists/psychologists with philosophical training) who would conceptualize the problems from within and develop a specific metalanguage for analyzing [End Page 265] them (Lanteri-Laura 1991; Reznek 1991; Sass 1992). Not all problems are of the same type. For those that are extrinsic to psychiatry/psychology (definition of the mental, the mind–body relationship, the distinction between causes and reasons, or interdisciplinary reduction), the methods common to the philosophy of science and of the mind can be used. However, issues intrinsic to the disciplines themselves (the nature of mental symptoms and how they are generated, how to explain their heterogeneity, what a MD is, how to diagnose and classify it, or how to implement a psychopathological project) cannot be dealt with using preestablished formulas, and require new and original proposals that take into account the nature of the disciplines and their object of study (Villagrán 2007).The authors of the target article base their preference for the centripetal approach for responding to one of the intrinsic questions of psychiatry (what MDs are) on the consequences of what they call the Charcot effect, a kind of variant of observer bias applied to psychiatric diagnosis. They offer as an example the classic diagnosis ad iuvantibus in its postmodern version, namely, the efficacy of the pharmaceutical industry in contributing to creating nosological entities for which their drugs are indicated. Consequently, clinicians are not only unable to surmount the substantial epistemological obstacles that hamper attempts to theorize, but also find themselves doomed to assuming an ingenuous essentialism that considers MDs as natural kinds (such as apples, trees, or dogs) determined... (shrink)

The aim of this paper is to introduce an alternative to Łukasiewicz’s 4-valued modal logic Ł. As it is known, Ł is afflicted by “Łukasiewicz type paradoxes”. The logic we define, PŁ4, is a strong paraconsistent and paracomplete 4-valued modal logic free from this type of paradoxes. PŁ4 is determined by the degree of truth-preserving consequence relation defined on the ordered set of values of a modification of the matrix MŁ characteristic for the logic Ł. On the other hand, PŁ4 (...) is a rich logic in which a number of connectives can be defined. It also has a simple bivalent semantics of the Belnap–Dunn type. (shrink)

Each science has its own domain of investigation, but one and the same science can be formalized in different languages with different universes of discourse. The concept of the domain of a science and the concept of the universe of discourse of a formalization of a science are distinct, although they often coincide in extension. In order to analyse the presuppositions and implications of choices of domain and universe, this article discusses the treatment of omega arguments in three very different (...) formalizations of arithmetic. In Peano's formalization the domain is a restricted class of individuals, while the universe of discourse is the unrestricted class of all individuals. In Gödel's formalization the domain is a restricted class of individuals as in Peano's formalization, but the universe of discourse coincides with the domain. In Whitehead-Russell's formalization the domain is a class of logical notions in Tarski's sense, that are necessarily not individuals, whereas the universe of discourse is the unrestricted class of individuals as in Peano's formalization. The present approach emphasizes the viewpoint that the universe of discourse of a given discourse is important in determining which propositions are expressed by which sentences. (shrink)

In his paper “Recent work in relevant logic”, Jago includes a section on Disjunctive Syllogism . The content of the section essentially consists of (a) a valuation of some work by Robles and Méndez on the topic as “not particularly interesting in itself”; (b) a statement establishing that “What would be interesting is to discover just how weak a relevant logic needs to be before disjunctive syllogism becomes inadmissible”. The main problem with this section of Jago’s paper on DS is (...) that the author is unaware of the recent important results on the topic. I show that (1) the valuation in (a) is groundless and (2) the ill-formulated problem in (b) is solved in the recent literature on relevant logics. (shrink)

The logic TM is the result of adding the mingle axiom, M to Ticket Entailment logic, T. In the present study, it is proved that TM has the variable-sharing property . Ternary relational semantics for TM is provided. Finally, an interesting extension of TM with the vsp is briefly discussed.

Suplemento a / Some Additions to: Jose M. Sevilla, "Bibliografía viquiana en español", Cuadernos sobre Vico, 1, 1991, pp. 179-196 ; ID., "Añadido a la bibliografía viquiana en español", Cuadernos sobre Vico, 3, 1993, pp. 199-205 ; ID., "Nuevo añadido a la Bibliografía Viquiana en español", Cuadernos sobre Vico, 5/6, 1995-1996, pp. 419-422 ; ID., "Tercer añadido a la Bibliografía Viquiana en español", Cuadernos sobre Vico, 7/8, 1997, pp. 451-455 . 307 nuevas entradas / 307 new entries nn. 500 - (...) 807. (shrink)

Suplemento a / Some Additions to: José M. Sevilla, "Bibliografía viquiana en español" entradas / entries 1-266; ID., "Añadido a la Bibliografía viquiana en español" , entradas / entries 267-364. Ahora 62 nuevas entradas / 62 new entries now: 365-426.

This article discusses two coextensive concepts of logical consequence that are implicit in the two fundamental logical practices of establishing validity and invalidity for premise-conclusion arguments. The premises and conclusion of an argument have information content (they ?say? something), and they have subject matter (they are ?about? something). The asymmetry between establishing validity and establishing invalidity has long been noted: validity is established through an information-processing procedure exhibiting a step-by-step deduction of the conclusion from the premise-set. Invalidity is established by (...) exhibiting a countermodel satisfying the premises but not the conclusion. The process of establishing validity focuses on information content; the process of establishing invalidity focuses on subject matter. Corcoran's information-theoretic concept of logical consequence corresponds to the former. Tarski's model-theoretic concept of logical consequence formulated in his famous 1936 no-countermodels definition corresponds to the latter. Both are found to be indispensable for understanding the rationale of the deductive method and each complements the other. This study discusses the ontic question of the nature of logical consequence and the epistemic question of the human capabilities presupposed by practical applications of these two concepts as they make validity and invalidity accessible to human knowledge. (shrink)

A system S has the “converse Ackermann property” if -> C is unprovable in S whenever C is a propositional variable. In this paper we define the fragments with the C.A.P. of some well-know propositional systems in the spectrum between the minimal and classical logic. In the first part we succesively study the implicative and positive fragments and the full calculi. In the second, we prove by a matrix method that each one of the systems has the C.A.P. Thus, we (...) think the problem proposed in Anderson & Belnap § 8.12 has been solved. (shrink)

Going from cognitive theory to neural data to ACT‐R models, the authors relate brain activity in a lexical ambiguity priming task to brain processes that resolve ambiguity in word meanings. These detailed data were tested and found compatible to the results of an ACT‐R computational model of reinforcement learning (RL). The model confirms and extends the behavioral findings to provide a RL account of individual differences in lexical ambiguity resolution.

Emotional intelligence (EI) stands at the nexus between intelligence and emotion disciplines, and we outline how EI research might be better integrated within both theoretical frameworks. From the former discipline, empirical research focused upon whether EI is an intelligence and what type of intelligence it constitutes. It is clear that ability-based tests of EI form a group factor of cognitive abilities that may be integrated into the Cattell–Horn–Carroll framework; less clear is the lower order factor structure of EI. From the (...) latter discipline, research linking EI with theoretical frameworks from emotion research remain relatively sparse. Emotion regulation and appraisal theory may be key to explain how EI may reflect different processes. We propose a research agenda to advance the EI study. (shrink)

In this article, we propose a philosophical exploration on the main problems involved in two neurorights that concern autonomous action, namely free will and cognitive liberty, and sketch a possible solution to these problems by resourcing to a holistic interpretation of human actions. First, we expose the main conceptual and practical issues arising from the neuroright to “free will,” which are far from minor: the term itself is denied by some trends participating in the neurorights debate, the related concept of (...) ultimate control is also disputed, the understanding of free will depends on cultural context, and the exercise of being free to act in several domains may be covered by other regulations. Second, we analyze the historical origin of cognitive liberty, its current status, and its relation with free will. Third, we criticize the concept of decision in mainstream action theory and propose to conceive action as a unified process constituted by three explanatory, non-sequential dimensions: intention, decision, and action realization. Fourth, we discuss two possible cases involving neurotechnologies and suggest ways to interpret them according to a unified framework in which free will and cognitive liberty fall under a single neuroright to personal autonomy. Finally, we outline a recommendation to introduce freedom of thought and personal autonomy as complementary neurorights to protect both the internal and external dimensions of thought and action. (shrink)

A simple, bivalent semantics is defined for Łukasiewicz’s 4-valued modal logic Łm4. It is shown that according to this semantics, the essential presupposition underlying Łm4 is the following: A is a theorem iff A is true conforming to both the reductionist and possibilist theses defined as follows: rt: the value of modal formulas is equivalent to the value of their respective argument iff A is true, etc.); pt: everything is possible. This presupposition highlights and explains all oddities arising in Łm4.

Aunque Vico hace varias referencias a Hobbes creemos que en realidad nunca tuvo un estrecho conocimiento del filósofo inglés. Pensamos que no merece la pena realmente buscar similitudes o coincidencias generales en textos seleccionados. Pero sí creemos que sería interesante comparar ambas actitudes metodológicas, su esfuerzo común por establecer las bases de una ciencia civil invirtiendo la "jerarquía de la evidencia", esto es, llevando el nivel de la ciencia social a las matemáticas y trasladando las ciencias naturales al rango de (...) la hipótesis.Although Vico makes several references to Hobbes, we are of the opinion that he never really had a narrow knowledge of the English philosopher. We do not think it worth to lock for similarities through some selected passages or some general coincidences. But we do think it interesting to compare both methodological attitudes, their common efforts to establish the bases of a civil science by reversing the "jerarchy of evidence", that is, by bringing the level of social science to that of mathematics and shifting the natural sciences to the rank of hypothesis. (shrink)

The reductionist/anti-reductionist debate about testimonial justification (and knowledge) can be taken to collapse into a controversy about two kinds of underlying monitoring mechanism. The nature and structure of this mechanism remains an enigma in the debate. We suggest that the underlying monitoring mechanism amounts to emotion-based stereotyping. Our main argument in favor of the stereotype hypothesis about testimonial monitoring is that the underlying psychological mechanism responsible for testimonial monitoring has several conditions to satisfy. Each of these conditions is satisfied by (...) our “hot” stereotypical capacities. Intergroup emotions play a key role here. Intergroup emotions inform the agent about which candidate stereotype is better suited to the current situation. Emotions serve as evidence that makes a certain stereotype and its particular profile of features more or less expected. (shrink)

Scholars have long debated whether leader's integrity affects managerial decision making with respect to social responsibility. In this paper, we propose a model in which transformational leadership mediates integrity and corporate social responsibility and examine the relationship between these concepts. A survey of 170 senior managers from 50 organizations was conducted. Results indicate that integrity is a predictor of transformational leadership behavior and that transformational leaders’ behaviors are linked to CSR practices. It was also found that leaders rated with higher (...) integrity are engaged in CSR because they exhibit more transformational leadership behaviors. These findings add to the extant literature by demonstrating that integrity is important as transformational leaders engage more actively on ‘responsible’ behaviors. Practical implications call for an understanding among corporate leaders of the benefits of integrity and how it relates to transformational leadership. Organizations can improve their selection and leadership development processes by focusing on these two dimensions. (shrink)

Comentario del libro de Franco Ratto, Materiali per un confronto: Hobbes-Vico . Guerra Edizioni, Perugia, 2000. pp. 181).

En su anterior estudio sobre la recepción de Vico en el s. XIX español, el autor analizó los casos de importantes intelectuales como Juan Donoso Cortés, Jaime Luciano Balmes, Juan Valera, Marcelino Menéndez Pelayo, Alfredo Adolfo Camus y Nicolás Serrano. Con ello se cumplió parte del plan de desmontar la tesis frecuentemente aceptada de una "ausencia" de Vico en España. Este plan se viene a desarrollar ahora con una nueva aportación investigadora en la que el autor muestra y analiza tres (...) importantes casos más de recepción viquiana: la del ecléctico historiador Fermin Gonzalo Morón, la del renovador neoescolástico Ceferino González, y la del fundador de la escuela jurídica catalana Manuel Durán y Bas. Con ellos el autor confirma su tesis de que Vico es apreciado, tanto desde la recepción positiva como desde la crítica, como un pensador modemo y heterodoxo de considerable valía.In his former paper on Vico’s reception during the XIX century in Spain, the author reviewed such significant intellectuals as Juan Donoso Cortés, Jaime Luciano Balmes, Juan Valera, Marcelino Menéndez Pelayo, Alfredo Adolfo Camus and Nicolás Serrano. In so doing, the task of dislodging the thesis so frequently held that there is a Vico’s "absence" in Spain was partially accomplished. This task is taken up again in a recent investigation where the author analyzes and assesses three further important cases related with the Spanish Vichian reception: that of eclectic historian Femín Gonzalo Morón, the neo-scholastic Ceferino González and finally the Catalan legal school founder Manuel Durán y Bas. With those examples the author aims to validate his claim that Vico was indeed acknowledged both as a modern and heterodox thinker by the positive as well as by the critical reception. (shrink)

Reseña crítica del volumen del Bollettino del Centro di Studi Vichiani que recoge las Actas del Congreso "Vico in Italia e in Germania" , con análisis de las aportaciones de Gebhardt, Agrimi, Otto, Cantelli, Papini, Grassi, Pinchard, Di Magno, Fellmann, Di Cesare, Badaloni, Poggeler, Jermann, Giuliani, Geldsetzer y Jacobelli Isoldi.A Critical review of the Bollettino del Centro di Studi Vichiani , volume which includes the Congress’ proceedings "Vico in Italia e in Germania" . It contains also an assessment of Gebhardt’s, (...) Agrimi’s, Otto’s, Cantelli’s, Papini’s, Grassi’s, Pinchard’s, Di Magno’s, Fellmann’s, Di Cesare’s, Badaloni’s, Poggeler’s, Jermann’s, Giuliani’s, Geldsetzer’s and Jacobelli Isoldi’s studies. (shrink)

El presente estudio contiene algunas recientes indagaciones que continúan y se agregan a anteriores trabajos del autor sobre el problema de la recepción de Vico en la cultura hispánica del siglo XIX.The present study contains some recent investigations that continue to previous works of the author on the problem of the reception of Vico during the XIX Century in the Hispanic culture.

This paper offers a particular intuitionistic negation completion of Urquhart's system C resulting in a super-intuitionistic contractionless propositional logic equivalent to Dummett's LC without contraction.

Suppose that we are interested in the average causal effect of a binary treatment on an outcome when this relationship is confounded by a binary confounder. Suppose that the confounder is unobserved but a nondifferential proxy of it is observed. We show that, under certain monotonicity assumption that is empirically verifiable, adjusting for the proxy produces a measure of the effect that is between the unadjusted and the true measures.